CFR Part 51); except that all persons who request such inspection and certification must provide adequate facilities in which the inspections may be conducted and also provide the necessary equipment and incidental supplies that are considered as standard requirements for providing fresh inspection under Federal or Federal-State inspection procedures.

§ 944.503 Table Grape Import Regulation 4.

(a)(1) Pursuant to section 8e of the Act and Part 944—Fruits, Import Regulations, the importation into the United States of any variety of vinifera species table grapes, except Emperor, Calmeria, Almeria, and Ribier varieties, is prohibited unless such grapes meet the minimum grade and size requirements specified in § 51.884 for U.S. No. 1 Table grade, as set forth in the United States Standards for Grades of Table Grapes (European or Vinifera Type, 7 CFR 51.880 through 51.912), except that grapes of the Flame Seedless variety shall meet the minimum berry size requirement of ten-sixteenths of an inch, and shall be considered mature if the juice contains not less than 15 percent soluble solids and the soluble solids are equal to or in excess of 20 parts to every part acid contained in the juice in accordance with applicable sampling and testing procedures specified in sections 1436.3, 1436.5, 1436.6, 1436.7, 1436.12, and 1436.17 of Article 25 of the California Administrative Code (Title 3).

(2) Such minimum maturity standards are incorporated by reference, copies of which are available from Ronald L. Cioffi, Chief, Marketing Order Administration Branch, F&V, AMS, USDA, Washington, D.C. 20250, telephone (202) 447–5697. They are also available for inspection at the office of the Federal Register Information Center, Room 8301, 1100 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20408. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register. These materials are incorporated as they exist on the date of approval and a notice of any change in these materials will be published in the **Federal Register.**

(3) All regulated varieties of grapes offered for importation during the 1986 season other than those arriving by ocean transport shall be subject to the grape import requirements effective April 15, 1986, through August 15, 1986, and ocean transport arrivals in 1986 shall be subject to the requirements during the period April 19, 1986, through August 15, 1986. In 1987, and every year thereafter, all regulated varieties of grapes offered for importation shall be subject to the specified import requirements effective May 1 through August 15.

(b) The Federal or Federal-State Inspection Service, F&V, AMS, USDA, is designated as the governmental inspection service for certifying the grade, size, quality, and maturity of table grapes that are imported into the United States. Inspection by the Federal or Federal-State Inspection Service with evidence thereof in the form of an official inspection certificate, issued by the respective service, applicable to the particular shipment of table grapes, is required on all imports. The inspection and certification services will be available upon application in accordance with the rules and regulations governing inspection and certification of fresh fruits, vegetables, and other products (7 CFR part 51) and in accordance with the Procedure for Requesting Inspection and designating the Agencies to Perform Requested Inspection and Certification (7 CFR 944.400).

(c) The term "importation" means release from custody of the United States Customs Service.

(d) Any lot or portion thereof which fails to meet the import requirements prior to or after reconditioning may be exported or disposed of under the supervision of the Federal or Federal-State Inspection Service with the costs of certifying the disposal of said lot borne by the importer.

Dated: April 9, 1986.

Thomas R. Clark,

Deputy Director, Fruit and Vegetable Division, Agricultural Marketing Service.

[FR Doc. 86–8263 Filed 4–9–86; 4:20 pm]

BILLING CODE 3410–02–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

Modification of General Design Criterion 4 Requirements for Protection Against Dynamic Effects of Postulated Pipe Ruptures

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Commission is modifying General Design Criterion 4 (GDC–4) of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50 to allow use of leak-before-break technology for excluding from the design basis the dynamic effects of postulated ruptures in primary coolant loop piping in pressurized water reactors (PWRs). The new technology reflects an engineering advance which allows simultaneously an increase in safety, reduced worker radiation exposures and lower construction and maintenance costs. Implementation will permit the removal of pipe whip restraints and jet impingement barriers as well as other related changes in operating plants, plants under construction and future plant designs. Containment design, emergency core cooling and environmental qualification requirements are not influenced by this modification.

EFFECTIVE DATE: May 12, 1986.

ADDRESSES: Copies of the written public comments are available for public inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John A. O'Brien, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301) 443–7854.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On July 1, 1985, the Commission published a proposed amendment to General Design Criterion 4 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50 relating to dynamic effects resulting from postulated pipe ruptures in primary coolant loop piping in pressurized water reactors. (50 FR 27006) The proposed rule was based on investigations performed by industry and by the NRC as well as the staff findings in the resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A–2. Future rulemaking was discussed in which application of the new technical approach would be extended to all reactor piping in all reactor types at some later date provided adequate technical justification can be supplied for each new application. The new technical approach depends on advanced fracture mechanics and includes investigations of potential indirect failure mechanisms which could lead to pipe rupture. Acceptable technical procedures and criteria are defined at length in NUREG–1061, Volume 3, dated November 1984 and entitled "Report of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Piping Review Committee, Evaluation of Potential for Pipe Breaks."

The proposed rule permitted a 60-day comment period. Twenty-four written comments were received from utilities, reactor vendors, architect-engineering firms, an intervenor, and industry groups representing as many as twenty-six utilities. Twenty-three of the written comments endorsed either the rule or the intent of the rule. The intervenor, alleging erroneous leak rate estimations,

opposed the rule. A compilation of the seven issues raised as a result of public comment, the accompanying Commission response and one additional issue raised as a result of oral comments made during an ACRS subcommittee meeting on May 23, 1985 follow:

Issue 1. The rule should be expanded to include piping in PWRs other than the primary coolant loop piping, and in addition, should cover piping in boiling water reactors (BWRs).

Commission Response: The Commission plans to publish in 1986 a broader proposed amendment to GDC–4 which would include all piping in all light water reactors (LWRs), as well as piping in gas and metal cooled reactors. The two-step approach was adopted because safety and economic benefits could immediately be obtained by an amendment limited to the primary coolant loops of PWRs. Sufficient technical information had been developed to justify application of leak-before-break technology to PWR primary coolant loop piping, and the decision was made to prepare a limited scope rule addressing the case which could be defended by the existing evidence.

Issue 2. The supplementary information to the rule should state that the amendment permits redesign of PWR primary coolant loop heavy component supports to reflect the exclusion of dynamic effects resulting from postulated pipe ruptures in primary coolant loops of PWRs.

Commission Response: This comment is accepted. The first sentence of the Scope of Rulemaking section in the proposed rule stated that (among other things) the dynamic effects of pipe rupture include "pipe break reaction forces". Because heavy components support design is determined, in part, by the imposed reaction forces, the elimination of postulated pipe rupture dynamic effects thus allows for a redesign of these supports. Supports, of course, must be able to withstand all remaining loads, including those due to the safe shutdown earthquake, with an acceptable margin of safety.

The Scope of Rulemaking section in the proposed rule also stated that:

> Current design margins in the primary coolant loop heavy component supports are to be maintained. Existing heavy components supports designed for the dynamic effects of pipe ruptures and seismic events are not affected. New plants will be designed with supports which have margins comparable and equivalent to those margins now present.

The intent of these three statements was to insure that component supports would still be designed with a margin of safey. The second sentence inadvertently became a discussion of the supports themselves rather than margins associated with the supports. The corrected statement is "Margins in existing heavy component supports designed for the dynamic effects of pipe rupture and seismic events are not affected." If the loads are revised by elimination of postulated pipe ruptures, the supports can be redesigned accordingly without affecting margins. Prohibiting heavy component support redesign would go beyond the guidance provided by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) that "Any relaxation of requirements to cope with double-ended guillotine break should be preceded by vigorous reexamination of the integrity of heavy component supports under all design conditions." The ACRS guidance has been interpreted to mean that heavy component supports must have adequate margins such that their failure will not be the cause of pipe rupture in primary coolant loop piping of PWRs.

The concern with heavy component support integrity stems from studies performed under subcontract to Lawrence Livemore National Laboratory (LLNL) which indicated that heavy component support failures during earthquakes were the dominant mechanism for causing a double-ended pipe rupture in primary coolant loop piping. However, as reported in Volume 1 of NUREG/CR–3660, "Probability of Pipe Failure in the Reactor Coolant Loops of Westinghouse PWR Plants", dated July 1985, and Volume 1 of NUREG/CR–3663, "Probability of Pipe Failure in the Reactor Coolant Loops of Combustion Engineering PWR Plants", dated January 1985 (each prepared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) only extremely large decreases in heavy component support seismic capacity have a significant impact on the probability of pipe ruptures in primary coolant loop piping. As a consequence, the Commission has decided that redesign of heavy component supports can be accepted so long as reliability and adequate margins under each required design and service load condition is achieved.

For operating plants, it is expected that a majority of heavy component support redesigns may involve elimination or decrease in load rating of existing snubbers in one or more support load paths. Redesign means the necessary reanalysis of supports and associated calculation of margins (excluding the dynamic effects of postulated pipe breaks as one of the required imposed loads) together with the physical modification of support configuration and hardware. In such redesigns, the licensee must demonstrate improved overall system performance and reliability when the existing component support loads paths are compared with those proposed. Utilities undertaking heavy component support redesign should also consider the use of independent design and fabrication verification procedures to minimize the potential for design and construction errors.

Plants under construction will be treated in the same manner as operating plants. For future plants, heavy component supports would be designed under faulted condition loads to the specified allowable stress limits, with the dynamic effects of postulated large diameter pipe breaks excluded.

In the context of this issue, the term "heavy component" means the reactor pressure vessel, the steam generators, the pressurizer and the reactor coolant pumps. However, with respect to the pressurizer, the pressurizer surge line and other piping directly connected to the pressurizer are still postulated to rupture for design purposes, under the limitations of this rule.

Issue 3. The rule should be extended to relax pipe rupture requirements for containment design, emergency core cooling system performance and environmental qualification of electrical and mechanical equipment.

Commission Response: The Commission acknowledges that this rulemaking will introduce an inconsistency into the design basis by excluding only the dynamic effects of postulated double-ended pipe ruptures in PWR primary coolant loops while retaining this postulated accident for emergency core cooling systems, containments and environmental qualification. The present view is that insufficient technical information is available for applying leak-before-break technology to other aspects of facility design. Further studies must be conducted to develop suitable replacement criteria for the PWR primary coolant loop doubled-ended pipe rupture if this accident is no longer required for containment design, emergency core cooling or environmental qualification. For the present, the proposed rule allows the removal of plant hardware which it is believed negatively affects plant performance, while not affecting emergency core cooling systems, containments, and environmental qualification of mechanical and electrical equipment.

Issue 4. The supplementary information to the rule should indicate

what analyses are needed to take advantage of the relaxation of requirements associated with dynamic effects of postulated pipe ruptures in the primary coolant loops of PWRs. Also, the acceptance criteria used in evaluating these analyses should be defined, particularly with regard to what would qualify as an "extremely low probability" of pipe rupture.

Commission Response: Acceptable analytical procedures and criteria to take advantage of this rule are outlined in NUREG–1061, Volume 3, dated November 1984 and entitled "Report of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Piping Review Committee, Evaluation of Potential for Pipe Breaks." Plant unique analyses are required to take advantage of this final rule. Licensees and applicants can rely on vendor calculated envelopes to demonstrate that their plants meet NRC requirements. Additionally, it must be shown that appropriate leakage detection devices are installed, and that any modifications as discussed in Issue 2 are clearly defined. After final publication of this rule, value/impact analyses would no longer be required as they were only necessary to justify exemptions from the original GDC–4 before this final rule is published. NRC acceptance criteria are illustrated in the Safety Evaluation Report prepared for near-term-operating-license applicants (for example, see those prepared for Vogtle or Catawba) and published in response to their exemption requests related to PWR primary coolant loop piping.

The definition of "extremely low probability" of pipe rupture is given as of the order of 10^{-6} per reactor year for PWR primary coolant loop piping when all pipe rupture locations are considered. This is consistent with past NRC decisions relating to other postulated events. This value, which includes the probability of an initiating event occurring (such as an earthquake, abnormal transient or an accident), conforms with the implicit design goal of components and structures that are engineered on a deterministic basis. Research performed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory confirmed that the three major U.S. vendors of pressurized water reactors meet this requirement.

Industry criteria for applying leak-before-break to piping are in the proposal stage (see ANS–58.2, "Design Basis for Protection of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants Against Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture"). These proposed criteria have not been formally accepted by the industry nor the Commission. However, NRC staff are participating in this activity.

Issue 5. The supplementary information to the rule should state that modifications of the licensed configuration of operating plants by the removal of pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shields may or may not involve an unreviewed safety question. Also, the rule should indicate that modifications consisting of removal of pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shields may not require license amendments.

Commission Response: These comments are accepted. The discussion in the proposed rule was confusing on this matter. The guidance below should be followed in the licensing context.

Modifications of the licensed plant design of operating plants may involve an unreviewed safety question under 10 CFR 50.59. Where it is determined that an unreviewed safety question is involved, licensees of operating plants desiring to make modifications should submit a license amendment for NRC approval in accordance with revised General Design Criterion 4. The license amendment may also include provisions for an augmented leakage detection system. A simple removal of pipe whip restraints and jet impingement barriers would not involve an unreviewed safety question. However, changing support load path designs would involve an unreviewed safety question.

Applicants for operating licenses seeking to modify design features to take advantage of the rule are required to reflect the revised design in an amendment to the pending FSAR. If the design change modifies design criteria set forth in the PSAR, an amendment to the applicable construction permit may also be necessary. The amendment to the FSAR, and the application for amendment of the construction permit if necessary, may include provisions for augmented leakage detection.

Issue 6. Installed leakage detection systems at some plants may be adequate, and upgrading or improvements may not be needed.

Commission Response: This comment is accepted. The proposed rule notice stated: "The license amendment *shall* also include provisions for an augmented leakage detection system. . . ." The revised text relating to this matter is given in the Commission Response to Issue 5. Leak detection systems are discussed in Volume 3 of NUREG–1061 "Report of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Piping Review Committee, Evaluation of Potential for Pipe Break", November 1984.

Issue 7. Leak-before-break technology depends on erroneous leak rate measurements and therefore cannot be applied to the reactor coolant system.

Commission Response: The NRC staff recognizes that the measurement or determination of leakage rates from a pressurized system involves uncertainties. For this reason, one criterion for application of leak-before-break is that postulated flaw sizes be large enough so that the leakage is about ten times the leak detection capability, and that this flaw be stable even if earthquake loads are applied to the pipe in addition to the normal operating loads. This margin of a factor of ten is more than ample to account for uncertainties in both leakage rate calculations and lead detection capabilities.

Additional sensitivity studies reported by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in NUREG/CR–2189, dated September 1981, entitled "Probability of Pipe Fracture in the Primary Coolant Loop of a PWR Plant" indicate that even in the absence of leak detection, the probability of pipe ruptures in PWR primary coolant loop piping is sufficiently low to warrant exclusion of these events from the design basis.

For these reasons, the Commission has determined that this issue is not sufficient basis to invalidate leak-before-break technology in PWR primary coolant loop piping.

Comment of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)

The ACRS orally requested an explicit definition of "primary coolant loop piping in pressurized water reactors" to clarify exactly the scope of affected piping. The term "primary coolant loop piping in pressurized water reactors" means the large diameter, thick walled piping directly connecting the reactor pressure vessel, the steam generators and the reactor coolant pumps. No branch piping from the above defined piping is considered part of the primary coolant loop piping in pressurized water reactors.

Having considered all of the above, the Commission has determined that a final rule be promulgated. The text of the final rule is identical to the text of the proposed rule. The final rule should be applied consistently with the guidance in this notice.

Availability of Documents

1. Copies of NUREG–1061, Volume 3, NUREG/CR–3660, NUREG/CR–3663 and NUREG/CR–2189 may be purchased by calling (202) 275–2060 or (202) 275–2171 or by writing to the Superintendent of

Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Post Office Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013–7082, or purchased from the National Technical Information Service, Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

2. ANS–58.2, "Design Basis for Protection of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants Against Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture," is available from The American Nuclear Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, Illinois 60525.

3. ACRS Letter to William J. Dircks, NRC Executive Director of Operations, dated June 14, 1983, dealing with fracture mechanics, is available in the NRC Public Document Room.

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore an environmental impact statement is not required. Although certain existing plant hardware may not be reinstalled after removal for inspection, this will not alter the environmental impact of the licensed activities. The environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and the finding of no significant impact are available from John A. O'Brien, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301) 443–7854.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This final rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget approval number 3150–0011.

Regulatory Analysis

The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this final regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission. The analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from John A. O'Brien, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301) 443–7854.

Backfit Rule

This amendment is not subject to the analysis requirements of 10 CFR 50.109(a)(3) because it does not require any modifications of existing facilities or procedures. The rule only permits licensees to exercise an option not previously available. Information relevant to the factors found in 10 CFR 50.109(c) may nevertheless be found in the Regulatory Analysis referenced above.

Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This rule affects only the licensing and operation of nuclear power plants. The companies that own these plants do not fall within the scope of the definitions of "small entities" set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small Business Size Standards set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration at 13 CFR Part 121.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50

Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention, Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 50.

PART 50—DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95–601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Sections 50.57(d), 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97–415, 96 Stat. 2071, 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80–50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100–50.102 also issued under sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273), §§ 50.10 (a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, 50.54, and 50.80(a) are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); §§ 50.10 (b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 161i, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and §§ 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, 50.73, and 50.78 are issued under sec. 161o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

2. In Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4 is revised to read as follows:

Appendix A—General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants

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Criteria

I. Overall Requirements

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Criterion 4—Environmental and missile design bases. Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including loss-of-coolant accidents. These structures, systems, and components shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles, pipe whipping, and discharging fluids, that may result from equipment failures and from events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit. However, the dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe ruptures of primary coolant loop piping in pressurized water reactors may be excluded from the design basis when analyses demonstrate the probability of rupturing such piping is extremely low under design basis conditions.

* * * * *

Dated at Washington, DC, this 7th day of April 1986.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Chilk,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 86–8192 Filed 4–10–86; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 86-ANE-11; Amdt. 39-5265]

Airworthiness Directives; Avco Lycoming ALF502L Series Turbofan Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) which requires an initial and repetitive inspections and replacement as necessary, of the fourth stage compressor vane assemblies installed on Avco Lycoming ALF502L series turbofan engines. The AD is needed to prevent release of fourth stage compressor vane airfoils into the compressor flow path which could result in a signficant engine power loss.

DATES: Effective April 11, 1986.

Compliance Schedule—As provided in the body of the AD.

Incorporation by Reference—Approved by the Director of the **Federal Register** effective on April 11, 1986.

ADDRESS: The applicable Service Bulletin (SB) may be obtained from Avco Lycoming Division, 550 South Main Street, Stratford, Connecticut 06497.

A copy of the SB is contained in the Rules Docket Number 86-ANE-11, in the Office of the Regional Counsel, Room Number 311, New England Region, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff Blazey, Engine Certification Branch, ANE-142, Engine Certification Office, Aircraft Certification Division, Federal Aviation Adminstration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; telephone (617) 273-7090.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that there have been 12 incidents of fourth stage compressor vane airfoil separations from the vane outer shroud on the Avco Lycoming ALF502L series turbofan engines. In one incident, each engine of a twin engine airplane was found to contain a separated fourth stage compressor vane airfoil. Release of an airfoil section into the internal flow path of each engine of a twin engine airplane could result in a significant loss of power in both engines. Since this condition is likely to exist or develop on other engines of the same type design, an AD is being issued which requires an initial and repetitive inspections, and replacement as necessary, of the fourth stage compressor vane assemblies installed on Avco Lycoming ALF502L series turbofan engines.

Since a situation exists that requires the immediate adoption of this regulation, it is found that notice and public procedures hereon are impracticable, and good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

Conclusion:

The FAA has determined that this regulation is an emergency regulation that is not considered to be major under Executive Order 12291. It is impracticable for the agency to follow the procedures of Order 12291 with respect to this rule since the rule must be issued immediately to correct an unsafe condition in aircraft. It has been further determined that this action involves an emergency regulation under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979). If this action is subsequently determined to involve a significant/major regulation, a final regulatory evaluation or analysis, as appropriate, will be prepared and placed in the regulatory docket (otherwise, an evaluation or analysis is not required). A copy of it, when filed, may be obtained by contacting the person identified under the caption **"FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT".**

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Engines, Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference.

Adoption of the Amendment

PART 39—[AMENDED]

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) as follows:

1. The authority citation continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1354(a), 1421, and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g) (Revised, Pub. L. 97-449, January 12, 1983); and 14 CFR 11.89.

2. By adding to § 39.13 the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

AVCO Lycoming Division: Applies to Avco Lycoming ALF502L series turbofan engines.

Compliance is required within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished within the last 50 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service from the last inspection.

To prevent engine power loss due to release of fourth stage compressor vane airfoils into the compressor flow path, accomplish the following:

(a) Inspect the fourth stage compressor vane assemblies, identified by Avco Lycoming Part Number (P/N) 2-100-040-27, for vane cracking at the outer shroud in accordance with Avco Lycoming Service Bulletin (SB) Number ALF502L-72-0137, dated March 27, 1986.

(b) Remove from service, prior to further flight, those fourth stage compressor vane assemblies found with vane airfoils missing, or cracked or separated at the outer shroud.

Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished.

Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office, Aircraft Certification Division, New England Region, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803.

Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Engine Certification Office, Burlington, Massachusetts, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD.

Avco Lycoming SB Number ALF502L-72-0137, dated March 27, 1986, identified and described in this document, is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received this document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Avco Lycoming Division, 550 South Main Street, Stratford, Connecticut 06497. These documents also may be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, New England Region, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803.

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on March 20, 1986.

Clyde M. DeHart Jr.,

Acting Director, New England Region.

[FR Doc. 86-8106 Filed 4-10-86; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-M

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14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 86-ANE-8; Amdt. 39-5267]

Airworthiness Directives; Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT9D-7R4G2 Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) which requires removal and replacement of the JT9D-7R4G2 engine support clevis at or before 3,000 cycles. The AD is needed to prevent possible clevis attachment lug fracture.

DATES: Effective April 11, 1986.